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Abstract: The article analyzes the structure, content, properties and effects of the 
Russian-Ukrainian ‘hybrid war’ in its non-military dimension. Particular emphasis is 
placed on the aspect of the information and propaganda war, as well as activities in 
cyberspace. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict is described in the context of the new war 
strategy of General Valery Gerasimov. Contemporary practice of hybrid actions in the 
conflict in Ukraine has revealed that, for the first time, a stronger opponent, Russia, 
uses the full spectrum of hybrid interaction on an opponent who is weak and unable 
to defend the integrity of its territory. The military conflict of 2014 showed not only 
the weakness of the Ukrainian state, but also, more importantly, the inefficiency of the 
organizations responsible for ensuring international security: NATO, OSCE and the 
UN. In the longer term, it should be noted that the escalation of hybrid activities in 
Ukraine clearly threatens the states on the Eastern flank of the North Atlantic Alliance. 
The analysis conducted refers to the problem defined in the form of questions: what 
is the essence of hybrid operations? What is the nature of non-military hybrid opera-
tions? What was the course of these activities in Ukraine? How was international law 
interpreted in relation to this conflict?
Key words: security, hybrid war, non-military dimension, Russian Federation, 
Ukraine
Introduction
The meaning of the term ‘hybrid war,’ understood as a formula com-bining military and non-military means, is not fixed and is constantly 
changing1 (Hoffman, The Janus choice…). This thesis is confirmed by the 
1 According to various definitions, hybrid war is: 1) a contemporary variation of 
guerrilla warfare, carried out with the help of modern military techniques and mobili-
zation methods; a combination of four types of aggression: traditional, irregular, ter-
rorist and cybernetic; 2) a variation of asymmetric conflict, carried out in three arenas: 
military activities, propaganda in one’s own country and international propaganda; 
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analysis of several definitions taken from normative acts, or the opinions 
of researchers dealing with this issue (Nemeth, Future war…). According 
to them, the concept of hybrid war should be understood as a resultant of 
several elements: the synthesis of means characteristic of armed struggle 
conducted by conventional methods and irregular actions; actions involv-
ing the use of military and non-military means integrated in an operation 
that is supposed to surprise the enemy, and then enable taking the initiative 
and gaining benefits through psychological influence – diplomacy, infor-
mation and radio-electronic activities are used to this end on a large scale; 
operations carried out in cyberspace, masking military and intelligence 
activities; exerting strong economic pressure on the opponent (Rattray, 
2004, pp. 20–26). The scope of the concept of hybrid war covers a wide 
range of information and propaganda activities, intelligence-diversionary, 
political-diplomatic and economic ones, with elements of lobbying and 
corruption. Of course, within this kind of conflict, apart from strictly non-
military forms, it is planned to conduct military operations with the help 
of traditional military means: regular army, partisan forces, and limited 
use of tactical nuclear weapons (Gruszczak, 2011, pp. 12–13).
A term ‘hybrid war’
The term ‘hybrid war’ was used for the first time in American military 
thought (Nemeth, Future war…).2 This term was propagated thanks to the 
narrative about the Israeli-Lebanese crisis, i.e. the conflict between Isra-
el and the Hezbollah organization (2006), in which the activities related 
to conventional war were combined with a description of the terror and 
guerrilla operations used (Hoffman, 2007, pp. 35–42). It was also used in 
the context of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, whose culmination took pla-
ce during protests at the Kiev Maidan in November 20133 (Wojnowski, 
3) a combination of elements of an irregular, domestic war, artificially induced upris-
ing and terrorism; 4) the use of traditional war methods, irregular activities, terrorism 
and criminal behavior on the battlefield in order to achieve political gains.
2 The author who, in 2002, introduced the concept of hybrid war to the American 
war narrative was William J. Nemeth. 
3 In the initial phase of activities undertaken in Ukraine, such terms as ‘non-
linear war’ and ‘special war’ were used. Until July 2014, the term ‘hybrid war’ did 
not appear in official statements of NATO representatives, or in the resolutions of the 
alliance. For the first time in relation to the Russian way of conducting operations in 
Ukraine, a Dutch general Frank van Kappen unofficially used the name, who on April 
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2016, p. 8). The subject of the article is issues related to an unimaginable 
aspect of the hybrid war in Ukraine, with particular emphasis on the so-
called information war4 (Darczewska, 2015a, pp. 59–73).
One of the conditions conducive to the effective pursuit of a hybrid 
war in its non-military aspect is the existence in the country under attack 
of national or religious minorities, which form a large part of society and 
identify with the aggressor. Using their resentment, the aggressor is able 
to manipulate their actions, engage them in military and intelligence ope-
rations, and, in extreme cases, to conflict separatist, radical and extremist 
movements. NATO experts claim that the crisis situation related to the 
Russian-Ukrainian conflict goes beyond the Ukrainian borders. The Rus-
sian authorities believe that the defense of ethnic Russians does not rest 
on the side of the countries in which they live, and is not subject to their 
rights, the government or the constitution, but remains at the discretion 
of Russia. According to Kurt Volker (U.S. ambassador to NATO), this 
approach of the Russian authorities to ethnic Russians, is not only “a bre-
ach in the understanding of international law, but also a hybrid warfare 
technique, called the new approach that has already been used, among 
others in Estonia in 2007, in Georgia in 2008 […] The concept of slow 
but systematic action causes the violation of sovereignty, is part of the 
strategic landscape of the well-known Russia for some time. […] Some-
times this includes more open and obvious moves, sometimes the moves 
are more subtle, it is a struggle with the help of economics, sometimes 
cyber-attacks carried out under the guise of independent activists.” In his 
opinion, “such a set of tactics of a hybrid war has been used by Russia for 
at least a few years” (Wojna hybrydowa…).
It should be noted that the application of the Western paradigm of 
war, in accordance with Clausewitz’s definition, to the Russian activities 
in Ukraine seems ineffective. According to the new concept of conflict 
by General Valery Gerasimov, “a new war will not have a beginning or 
26, 2014 called the Russian operations ‘hybrid.’ The authorities of the North Atlantic 
Pact officially announced that the war in the southeast of the Ukrainian state is a hy-
brid war on July 3, 2014.
4 This aspect is important because Russia has transformed the real Ukrainian-
Russian conflict and armed intervention in Ukraine into the virtual conflict of Russia, 
not only with Kiev but also with the West. We can notice here a clear return to the old 
foreign policy model based on competition with Western Europe, and above all with 
the United States. Ultimately, the West remains helpless in the face of a revisionist 
Russia’s policy, and there is no effective idea to neutralize the information campaigns 
that accompany it.
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an end in the classical meaning (declaration of war, capitulation). Direct 
encounters of soldiers ‘eye to eye’ will be rare, they will be replaced by 
precise rocket strikes from a long distance. […] the division between sol-
diers and civilians will be blurred. The latter, armed by their own states, 
will pose a serious threat to regular units due to their irregularity. […] The 
most important feature of the new war is that it will no longer be an old-
fashioned struggle on the battlefields or streets of cities, but above all in 
people’s heads. As Ukraine shows today, it is no longer about destroying 
the opponent, but about getting an influence on him, preferably one that 
he does not realize. Paradoxically, the purpose of such war is to lead to 
a situation in which the use of physical force will no longer be needed, as 
it happened in the Crimea. The point is for people to betray their own state 
and support the aggressor” (Wójcik, 2014, p. 18).
In this case, it is difficult to speak of a specific paradigm, a pattern of 
activities carried out and to say whether the concept by Gerasimov is a ba-
sic concept in Russian military thought. Let us note that in Soviet military 
thought the characteristic feature was based on two dimensions: military-
technological and socio-political. “The latter was to play a softening role 
– socio-political weapons were to prepare the ground for possible interven-
tion, weaken the opponent’s will to fight with propaganda, disinformation 
or, for example, diversion – like sponsoring pacifist movements in Western 
countries. Such a strategy is not able to stop even the most modern tanks 
and planes, because it is based not on killing, but on convincing, focusing 
on emotions” (Wójcik, 2014, p. 18). The novelty in this approach relies on 
the use of modern technology in the sphere of information warfare, as well 
as on the use of conventional armed activities.
The quote from the head of the Russian General Staff can in fact be 
regarded as an information and psychological operation, whose main goal 
is to convince the West that Russia has a new, previously unknown stra-
tegy for military operations. It seems that these actions had the expected 
effect – in the decision-making centers, media and societies of the mem-
ber countries of NATO and the European Union (EU). There is a general 
opinion that the Russian Federation is currently operating a ‘new model 
of modern war,’ which is called ‘the Russian hybrid war.’ It was suppo-
sed to consist of using a whole range of political, diplomatic, military, 
informational, economic and cultural means, which were appropriately 
selected and combined in such a way that their synchronized use would 
bring about the intended results. “Such seemingly little serious games are 
for Putin multifunctional. First of all, they allow the initiative to be ma-
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intained on the basis of: let’s do something non-standard, let them think 
in Brussels and Washington that these are the next elements of our Great 
Plan. And let them be afraid” (Trofymowych, 2016, p. 181).
In hybrid warfare, the adversary most likely presents unique combina-
tional threats specifically designed to target U.S. vulnerabilities. Instead 
of separate challengers with fundamentally different approaches (conven-
tional, irregular, or terrorist), we can expect to face competitors who will 
employ all forms of war, including criminal behavior, perhaps simultane-
ously. This expectation suggests that our greatest challenge in the future 
will come not from a state that selects one approach, but from states or 
groups that select from the whole menu of tactics and technologies, and 
blend them in innovative ways to meet their own strategic culture, geo-
graphy, and aims (Hoffman, 2009, p. 5).
A characteristic feature of the hybrid war is the prevalence of non-mi-
litary means over armed struggle. For this reason, it is not possible to re-
gard a hybrid war as a war in the classical sense of the word, which is why 
it is postulated to define the characteristic activities of the term ‘hybrid 
aggression,’ which more precisely defines the specificity of this type of 
conflict. The main designations of hybrid aggression are information and 
propaganda, reconnaissance-diversionary, political-diplomatic and eco-
nomic activities, with elements of lobbying and corruption. In addition, 
this type of conflict provides for the possibility of conducting military 
operations with the help of a regular army, partisan forces and limited use 
of tactical nuclear weapons. The genesis of this ‘new’ way of conducting 
war used by Russia is seen by some Western experts in the strategy of 
indirect actions described by the British military Basil Liddell Hart, in the 
total strategy of Erich Ludendorff, and in the concept of the use of unlimi-
ted combat measures promoted by the Chinese military, Qiao Liang and 
Wang Xiangsui (Liang, Xiangsui, 1999).
The ‘Russian hybrid war’ therefore consists of using a whole range of 
political, diplomatic, military, informational, economic and cultural me-
ans, which are appropriately selected and combined in such a way that 
their synchronized use will bring about the intended results. As empha-
sized, in this ‘new Russian model’ the war has no beginning or end and 
the division between soldiers and civilians is blurred. Military operations 
are not preceded by a political declaration of the initiation of war, they 
are carried out by surprise, and are initiated by small subunits of regular 
and irregular armed forces, during peacetime (guerrilla groups, special 
forces, ‘green men,’ etc.). The main battlefield of this modern war, waged 
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by Russia in Ukraine is no longer the physical space, but, above all, the 
unlimited sphere of psychological influence. These actions do not aim 
at the physical annihilation of the enemy and occupation of its territory, 
but their goal is to break the opponent’s will to limit his resistance (Fryc, 
2015, pp. 62–66). Analyzing the context of the application of Western 
terminology in the Russian Federation, it should be remembered that the 
Russians, in adopting foreign conceptual apparatus, are guided by their 
own assumptions and logic, adapting it to their needs, traditions and cul-
ture (Darczewska, 2015b, p. 1).
As the events in the southeast of the Ukrainian state unfolded, the 
Western concept of a hybrid war became a tool of Kremlin anti-Western 
propaganda in the Russian Federation. In this context, the dissertation by 
Ruslan Puchow – the director of the Center for Analysis of Strategy and 
Technology in Moscow is of particular interest. His main thesis is that 
the Russian side in both the Crimea and the eastern districts of Ukraine 
has not used any new ways of fighting or tactical solutions that the West 
defines as a hybrid war. Meanwhile, according to NATO, Russia, using 
this ‘new tactic,’ has become much more dangerous for the West than 
the USSR was. As evidence of the belief prevailing in the West, Puchow 
recalls the statement of NATO Secretary General Anders Rasmussen, and 
the Western definitions of the hybrid war. He disagrees with the opinions 
expressed in the West, according to which in the period from February 
to April 2014 Russian forces could, in some innovative way, use the in-
fantry, airborne troops and special forces, combining their activities with 
IT and radio-electronic operations and using cyberspace and the media 
to conduct a broad information campaign aimed at internal and external 
recipients. A similar opinion is expressed in the case of eastern Ukraine, 
where the Russians were to inspire the actions of pressure groups compo-
sed of local people, and create and manage such groups. Puchow denies 
that the Russian side was operating in cyberspace, which in his opinion 
was not necessary in the case of the Ukrainian army, due to its small de-
gree of computerization and the archaic equipment at its disposal in Cri-
mea. The analyst also tries to show that the propaganda activities against 
the population of the Crimean Peninsula were very limited, because the 
real intention and readiness to carry out an attack in a given place is not 
publicly proclaimed.
In addition, the annexation of the peninsula met with an enthusiastic 
reception in the Russian Federation, where everybody considered Cri-
mea as ‘Russian soil’ anyway. Therefore, any propaganda activities were 
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simply superfluous. In the opinion of Puchow, Western analysts who try 
to prove that Russia’s success was the result of hybrid war ignore the 
unique character of the Crimean operation and are trying to conceal their 
‘incorrect’ assessment of these events. According to him, the uniqueness 
of the annexation of Crimea was manifested in the fact that Moscow used, 
above all, the ruthless support of the local population, which enabled the 
paralysis of Ukrainian military units stationed in the Crimea. As the Rus-
sian analyst argues, it is hard to imagine the emergence of ‘green men’ 
in another country, such as Poland or the United States. In this case, the-
re would be no logical explanation for such an action and no chance of 
success. An additional factor favoring the Kremlin was the fact that there 
were Russian military bases on the peninsula, which created the possibi-
lity of secretly strengthening the Russian military presence in the Crimea 
by supplying military units and equipment which NATO intelligence was 
unable to see (Puchov, 2015, p. 1).
Russian non-military actions in Ukraine
In the case of these modern military operations conducted by Russia in 
Ukraine, the basis is no longer the physical space, but, above all, the unli-
mited sphere of psychological influence. There are many indications that 
in fact the Russian attack on Ukraine began well before President Viktor 
Yanukovych left the country, and in the period preceding the conflict, 
the Russian side intensified its media campaign there. “Before Russian 
troops entered the building of the regional parliament in Simferopol, the 
capital of Crimea, on March 18, the Kremlin was already sure of victory. 
The Kremlin guaranteed it long before, infiltrating the Ukrainian state 
apparatus with bribes, intimidation and cyber-espionage. It will not be an 
exaggeration to say that the Kremlin was better informed about Ukraine’s 
plans and the possibilities of repelling the attack than the Kyiv govern-
ment itself. As a result of Russian economic pressure on Ukraine – the 
combination of energy sanctions, trade blockades and manipulation in 
the financial sector – the state was bankrupt before the war began. The 
decision-making process was not only fraught with errors, but also not 
very transparent. The Russian propaganda ensured that the inhabitants of 
Crimea and other parts of Ukraine felt that the nazis had been replaced 
by fascists, and that people who speak Russian are persecuted” (Lucas, 
2015, p. 16).
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The ongoing hybrid conflict in Ukraine made the public aware of the 
important role played by skillfully organized propaganda. One cannot for-
get that one of the most important goals of modern hybrid wars is winning 
the battle in the opponent’s mind. To achieve this, it is necessary to have an 
open media market, in which the aggressor, in terms of the level of access to 
modern telecommunications technologies, is in a strong position among the 
population of the attacked state, which will enable widespread familiariza-
tion with propaganda and information materials posted on social networks, 
websites or hosting platforms (Rácz, 2015, p. 81). The Russian monopoly 
on mass media in post-Soviet countries (including Ukraine) turned out to 
be very important here, enabling the creation of a closed information space, 
thanks to which only a coherent, Russian account reached the public awa-
reness, showing Ukraine as a weak, fallen country and deprived of the pro-
spects of geopolitical existence; the creation of an alternative pro-Russian 
power center around the overthrown president Viktor Yanukovych, and the 
use of the former president to undermine the legality of the new Ukrainian 
authorities. Wide-scale disinformation activities disseminated in the press, 
radio, television and on the Internet; among others, the case of the so-called 
doctor from Odessa5 (Analysis, 2014, pp. 27–28) and the story about the fact 
that the flagship of the Ukrainian Navy Hetman Sahaydachniy had turned 
to the Russian side; large-scale promotion in the media of photos of fallen 
Ukrainian soldiers, destroyed military equipment and deaths of civilians, in 
order to intimidate or discourage Ukrainian citizens from undertaking mili-
tary service. The political tensions and conflicts within the ruling coalition 
in Kyiv were exaggerated in the media messages, which was supposed to 
undermine confidence in the new authorities. Other messages concerned 
the creation in the West of a pro-Russian lobby based in Euroskeptic parties 
with reference to the issues related to gas distribution, by making European 
countries aware that Ukraine will be responsible for all future problems 
related to the transfer of gas.
5 As part of the Russian information war, the profile of a doctor, Igor Rozowski, 
was fabricated on Facebook. On Rozowski’s profile, information appeared suggest-
ing ‘pro-Ukrainian extremists’ were preventing him from helping people trapped in 
burning buildings in Odessa. Rozowski also described the alleged savagery that the 
Ukrainian fighters perpetrated. His story gained enormous popularity in Russian so-
cial media, it was also translated into English and German. Soon, however, it turned 
out that the photo of Rozowski placed on the profile was actually a photo of another 
doctor from the North Caucasus. This profile proved to be a tool of war in cyberspace, 
with the help of which Russian propaganda exerted influence on the emotions and 
views of the external and internal audience.
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The possibilities inherent in the skillful use of information were con-
firmed in particular by the way in which the Russians annexed the Crime-
an peninsula. The activities aimed at taking over Crimea began on the ni-
ght of February 27–28, 2014. A group of armed men invaded the premises 
of the local parliament and the government of the Autonomous Republic 
of Crimea in Simferopol and raised Russian national flags. The incident 
took the Ukrainian forces completely by surprise, which, in the situation, 
were not able to react. It cannot be ruled out that this first strike group, 
which claimed to be the so-called self-defense of Crimea, was created 
by soldiers and officers of the Russian special forces (Olchawa, 2016, 
pp. 173–174). Consistent adherence to radio silence made it impossible 
to locate Russian leadership and information centers. License plates were 
removed from the vehicles of the rebels moving across the peninsula, all 
indications of national and organizational affiliation were removed from 
the uniforms of regular Russian troops. In addition, fighters who created 
irregular formations had various weapons and uniforms which made it 
impossible to identify them. Preparation and disinformation proved ne-
cessary not only in the case of the Crimean operation, but also in the fur-
ther stages of Russian aggression on the territory of Ukraine. These acti-
vities included the following elements: the conflict of national and ethnic 
groups within the state on the basis of historical identity, by stimulating 
and strengthening Soviet resentments while exposing the significance and 
role of radical nationalist groups (“Right Sector,” “Freedom,” “Azow”).
Disinformation was a priority, and the participation of Russian sol-
diers in armed operations in Ukraine was masked by the creation of vo-
lunteer separatist forces. The concentration of Russian troops transferred 
to Ukraine took place under the pretext of exercises in border divisions. 
Of course, this tool can be included in the fixed set of measures of Rus-
sian operations. It was used successfully in the war with Georgia, but the 
novelty in the activities in Ukraine was preparing for war in cyberspace 
(Darczewska, 2014, p. 2; Kuk, 1994, p. 2; Raport, 2009, p. 4). Hundreds 
of websites and social networking sites of seemingly independent, objec-
tive and informative character, but in fact mutually connected and coor-
dinating active disinformation activities, became visible in the network 
(Darczewska, 2014, p. 28; Cheda, Rosyjska wojna informacyjna…; Sank-
cje, 2015, p. 99).
A very effective disinformation method turned out to be rumor, authen-
ticated by information provided by Russian politicians and the military. 
The assumed purpose of the dissemination of information of this type was 
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to create a sense of intimidation during the mobilization of the Ukrainian 
army, which proceeded in an atmosphere of fear and distrust, as well as 
during military operations. These assumptions proved to be effective, as 
evidenced by the retreat of the Ukrainian army at Zelenopilla, Ilowajsk, 
Debalceve, and the losses incurred then were considered “a panic result 
originated by the Russian media bombing soldiers with information about 
the full lap, which turned a controlled retreat into a disjointed escape” 
(Cheda, Rosyjska wojna informacyjna…).
Russia used the weakest points of the Ukrainian side, publicizing facts 
often incompatible with reality. The aim of the information attacks was to 
promote negative phenomena in the society and the elites of the Ukrainian 
authorities; such phenomena as the widespread corruption and powerful 
nationalism prevailing in the western regions of Ukraine, and the discord 
between the presidential and prime ministerial camps, remained the basic 
objectives of the attacks of information war. In the case of the annexation 
of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia and the battles in south-eastern Ukra-
ine, there were irregular activities involving the large-scale use of officers of 
the Russian special services and soldiers of Specnaz special units as ‘local 
self-defense units,’ whose task in the first stage of actions taken as part of 
a hybrid war, consisted of instigating and inspiring dissatisfaction among the 
local population, manipulation of public opinion, first of all in the local envi-
ronment, and at the final stages of the entire operation involved taking over, 
controlling and securing government administration buildings, infrastructure 
and military units. In the second stage, aimed at the destabilization of eastern 
Ukraine, actions taken by the Russian side were dominated by conventio-
nal military operations undertaken in the Luhansk and Donetsk region, du-
ring which modern military equipment (tanks, heavy artillery, anti-aircraft 
weapons) was used. They were led by branches of pro-Russian separatists, 
Russian ‘volunteers’ and mercenaries from other countries. The Russian Fe-
deration successfully used all the emerging opportunities to strengthen its 
position on the occupied territory; the Olympic Games in Sochi can be men-
tioned as an event that effectively absorbed the attention of global public 
opinion and gave the Russians the opportunity of placing military units near 
the south-eastern border of the Ukrainian state. This action was explained by 
the necessity to ensure safety for the participants of the games, which did not 
raise any suspicions. In practice, these troops were used to protect the actions 
of the Russian special forces in Crimea during the invasion. The authors of 
the concept of ‘small war’ and ‘rebel war’ paid particular attention to the use 
of the ‘protest potential’ in the country of the opponent.
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Therefore, it is not surprising that the use of local parties and politi-
cal organizations inspired, financed and developed by the Kremlin was 
one of the basic elements of the Crimean collaboration.6 The main we-
apon used by the Russian side during the Crimean operation was actions 
bearing the characteristics of ideological subversion, as well as measu-
res of so-called reflective management7 (Wojnowski, 2015, pp. 11–36). 
An example of this type of activity may be the disinformation regarding 
the transmission by Interfax-Ukraine on March 3, 2014, referring to an 
unofficial source in the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, of information 
concerning the ultimatum issued by the command of the Black Sea Fle-
et to Ukrainian units blocked in the Crimea. According to its content, if 
by March 4, 2014, at 5am, these troops did not surrender, then Russian 
troops and pro-Russian fighters would attack all objects in the hands of 
Ukrainians. This information was ultimately denied by the Russian side, 
and the purpose of its transmission was supposed to have influenced the 
position of the Ukrainian side on the UN Security Council. Attempts were 
made to disintegrate and weaken the morale of the Ukrainian army. One 
of such actions was the appointment on March 24, 2014 of Admiral Denis 
Berezovsky as deputy commander of the Black Sea Fleet, who earlier, on 
March 2, supported the Russians. It was a clear signal for all Ukrainian 
soldiers that the Russian Federation would appreciate the merit of anyone 
who would help support its activities in Crimea (Wrzosek, 2014, p. 24; 
Wojnowski, 2015, p. 111).
In this phase of the conflict, there were also terrorist activities, includ-
ing the murder of Volodymyr Ivanovych Rybak, Stepan Chubenko, Yuriy 
Ivanovyvh Dakowskyi, Poplavka Juriy Juryoviycz kidnapping members 
of the OSCE mission in April and May 2014, abducting Ukrainian politi-
6 A significant number of such organizations took part in the activities. These 
were: The Choice of Ukraine under the leadership of Viktor Medwiedczuk, and Rus-
sian Unity of Sergey Aksyonov, a.k.a. Goblin, the head of the local mafia (although 
his party gained less than 14% of support, Aksionow became prime minister of the 
self-proclaimed government formed in Simferopol). The organizations included ac-
tivists of the Union of Crimean Cossacks, Crimean Front, activists of the Russian 
Bloc, National Liberation Movement and Taurus Alliance and Eurasian Youth Union 
under the leadership of Pavel Kanishtche and Artur Dugin.
7 The term ‘reflexive management’ should be understood here as the total of social 
manipulation and control techniques consisting of energy methods (force, coercion, 
pressure, fear) and information-psychological (propaganda, disinformation), whose 
preparation is based on the creation of a special model of the opponent imitating his 
behavior.
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cal and social activists loyal to Kyiv (Bicie, porwania, tortury…; Aleh-
no, “Żywe	 tarcze”…), using the civilian population as live shields, or 
shooting down a passenger plane of Malaysian airlines on July 17, 20148 
(Radziwinowicz, 2014, p. 17). During the military operation, there was an 
immediate creation of an alternative center of power. As early as March 
11, 2014, the Crimean parliament controlled by Moscow proclaimed the 
independence of the Crimean Autonomous Republic, and five days later 
a ‘referendum’ on joining the peninsula to Russia was held according to 
the old, tried and tested Russian method. The day of March 16, 2014, on 
which the referendum was held, can be considered a caesura marking the 
end of the Russian operation.
Summing up, it should be stated that the contemporary practice of 
hybrid actions in the conflict in Ukraine has revealed that there has been 
a change in the party using hybrid activities. In this case, hybrid chal-
lenges are no longer limited only to non-state actors and to the stereoty-
pe of thinking that the weaker opponent uses this form of action against 
the stronger one. For the first time, the opponent was definitely stronger, 
a global power – Russia – used the full spectrum of hybrid impact on 
a weak opponent, unable to defend the integrity of its territory, and “the 
Kremlin media are mocking that Russian tanks in Ukraine have predicted 
the world” (Radziwinowicz, 2014, p. 17). The Russian-Ukrainian con-
flict, but more importantly, the success of the escalation of hybrid activi-
ties in Ukraine, undoubtedly threatens the countries of the Eastern flank 
of the North Atlantic Alliance (Banasik, Parafianowicz, 2015, p. 13). The 
crisis situation developed in such a way that it could not be considered 
a crisis in the European Union. It is an undisputed fact that in the imme-
diate future, there is no possibility of Ukraine regaining not only Crimea, 
annexed by Russia despite opposition from the West, but also other areas 
in the east of the country over which the authorities in Kyiv lost control. 
What is more, even the current truce is threatened, the complete break of 
which would threaten Ukraine with further territorial losses.
8 In the latter case, the Russian authorities presented ‘irrefutable evidence’ that 
the Malaysian Boeing 777 with 298 people on board was shot down by Ukrainian 
fighters over Donbas. Part of it was the testimony of the mythical ‘Spanish flight dis-
patcher’ who was supposed to be on duty at Borispol airport in Kiev at the time of the 
tragedy. The name of the Ukrainian pilot who allegedly shot the plane down was also 
given. Representatives of the Russian army – referring to the results of “independent 
investigation” – also depicted on charts the attack of two Ukrainian fighters on a pas-
senger jet.
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International law regarding the hybrid war in Ukraine
In order to understand what the concept of hybrid war actually is, and 
why such a term is used to describe the situation in the Donbas region 
and the annexing of the Crimean Peninsula, the phenomenon and legal 
qualification of armed conflict in international law needs to be discussed. 
The Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case referred to the issue of armed 
conflict, recognizing that armed conflict arises at the moment when the 
parties refer to the use of armed forces or similar activities. This crite-
rion has been met in the case of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, as both 
sides conduct military operations using appropriate weapons. According 
to the Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, a non-
international conflict “takes place in the territory of a High Contracting 
Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other orga-
nized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such 
control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained 
and concerted military operations” (Article 1 of Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 regarding the protection of 
victims of non-international armed conflicts, Protocol II). Thus, internal 
armed conflict occurs when at least one of the parties is of a non-govern-
mental character (Vite, 2009, pp. 75, 180). In the event of the conflict in 
Donbas, the parties are carrying out regular military operations, although 
the Ukrainian army is mostly defensive (according to the Charter of the 
United Nations, 1945, Article 45, Ukraine has the right to use force to 
defend its territorial integrity, which is an exception to the prohibition of 
the use of force in the case of ‘armed robbery’).
Considering that, in the sense of the UN Charter, an armed attack on 
another country is a sine qua non condition for the application of the right 
to self-defense, the strategy of the government and the armed forces of 
Ukraine seems still to include a peaceful solution to this conflict. There-
fore, looking through the prism of the provisions of the Second Special 
Protocol referred to above, the conflict in Donbas seems to fulfil the con-
ditions of an internal armed conflict, apart from the active participation 
of regular soldiers and armaments from a third state – the Russian Fede-
ration. However, one should consider the question of whether, in light of 
international law, the state can be considered a party to the conflict when 
its official position is to definitely deny it. Even if, under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, the Security Council is authorized to recognize the Rus-
sian Federation as a party to the conflict and to impose certain temporary 
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measures, this scenario seems unlikely, as long as the Russian Federation, 
as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, continues to exercise 
its veto and effectively block any resolutions of the Security Council.
In addition to the types of armed conflict outlined in international law, 
the concept of internationalized armed conflict can also be distinguished. 
This is the situation of the conflict between two factions or internal gro-
ups that are supported by other states (Schindler, 1982, p. 255) or the situ-
ation when an armed third country intervenes in an internal armed conflict 
(Gasser, 1983, pp. 145–146). As part of the intervention, it is possible to 
distinguish the situation of third country intervention in order to support 
one of the parties, or the intervention of multinational forces in order to 
conduct a peacekeeping operation (Vite, 2009, p. 85). In the context of an 
internationalized armed conflict, it should be noted that the armed conflict 
in eastern Ukraine does not have this character, because at least one of the 
parties is of a governmental nature and no ‘official’ military intervention 
has taken place. However, the question is whether the support of the Rus-
sian Federation can be considered an armed intervention.
One of the most important aspects of the armed conflict in Eastern 
Ukraine related to the phenomenon of hybrid war is the fact that the state 
supporting one of the parties to the conflict through the statements of 
its representatives completely denies any separatist support. This fact is 
directly related to one of the elements of the hybrid war – information 
war, aimed primarily at denying the existing reality and presenting only 
properly prepared information. Information warfare, or ‘proper’ informa-
tion management, which reaches a wider audience, is an element of the 
general psychological war to which the parties of armed conflicts have 
referred quite often (Lord, 1989, pp. 16–23). The information war in the 
case of military operations in the Donbas is directly related to the propa-
ganda carried out by the Russian media, whose main purpose is to conceal 
the presence of members of their armed forces in the armed operations in 
eastern Ukraine from the audience of these media in the territory of the 
Russian Federation. The most important manifestation of all attempts to 
conceal the truth from the citizens of the Federation is the fact that most 
families of Russian soldiers sent to Ukraine are told that they are being 
sent to a training ground in another region of the Federation.
The information war is not, however, the only aspect of a hybrid war, 
which can best be described as a war in which the parties actually taking 
part depart from the conventional and customary methods of warfare. To 
a large extent, the situation in eastern Ukraine is reflected in the resolu-
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tion of the European Parliament, which, in referring to the pursuit of the 
hybrid war by the Russian Federation, takes the following aspects into 
account: information war; the use of elements of cyber war by the Rus-
sian Federation; use of regular and irregular armed forces by the Russian 
Federation; the use of propaganda; application of economic pressure and 
energy blackmail; political and diplomatic destabilization. The text of the 
European Parliament resolution expresses one of the few positions of the 
international community that most closely reflects the essence of the con-
flict. Undoubtedly, the most important of all aspects of the hybrid war 
led by the Russian Federation against Ukraine is the issue of the use of 
soldiers belonging to its armed forces while the uniforms of these soldiers 
bear no signs or symbols that allow their identification. From the perspec-
tive of international law, in particular the international responsibility of 
states, this circumstance is of enormous significance, since by showing 
that these soldiers belong to the armed forces of the Russian Federation 
and are acting in accordance with the orders of the relevant commanders 
of the Russian Armed Forces, this responsibility can be attributed to the 
use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence 
of Ukraine, which constitutes a blatant violation of the basic principles 
of international law (Czapliński, 2009). In turn, depending on how the 
international community defines the conflict in eastern Ukraine, which 
is currently not clearly defined, it will be possible to hold individuals 
accountable for the violation of, for example, international humanitarian 
law, if military activities in the Donbas region are recognized as an armed 
conflict of an international nature. It would seem that all the aspects of 
a hybrid war have been taken into account, but we should also mention 
the ongoing alliances, both official and less official.
At present, these alliances are usually economic and trade agreements 
aimed at strengthening the position of these countries in the future. Qu-
alification of the conflict in eastern Ukraine also concerns cooperation in 
the political sphere. As one of the aspects of the hybrid war, one should 
also mention the non-uniformity of at least one of the parties (McCulloh, 
Johnson, 2003, pp. 21–22). Non-uniformity refers to the composition of 
forces or groupings carrying out military operations on one of the sides. 
In addition to the notion of a hybrid war, there is also the notion of an 
‘asymmetric conflict’ that persists between a state that respects the law of 
armed conflicts or international humanitarian law, and groups that barely 
acknowledge the above laws and do not show the will to observe them 
(Cohen, 2010, p. 5). It is not subject to discussion that the Russian Fe-
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deration sent the so-called ‘green men’ during the events preceding the 
referendum on the Crimean Peninsula, who wore uniforms without sym-
bols enabling their identification, who were armed and spoke a dialect 
of Russian not corresponding to those spoken by the Russian-speaking 
population in Crimea or the eastern regions of Ukraine. Considering the 
events preceding the unlawful referendum on the Crimean Peninsula and 
the circumstances in which armed operations began in the eastern districts 
of Ukraine, we can risk the statement that both cases were a direct result 
of an act of aggression (The Statute of the International Criminal Court 
in Rome, 1998, Article 5). This aggression is one of the crimes of interna-
tional law of the Russian Federation against Ukraine.
The Security Service of Ukraine has repeatedly reported that in the re-
gion covered by military operations it found and secured large amounts of 
Russian weapons. Both the Crimean Peninsula and the territory subordi-
nate to separatist groups are now under armed occupation of the Russian 
Federation, and in both of these areas regular soldiers of the armed for-
ces of the Russian Federation along with heavy armaments are stationed, 
which are necessary to maintain further control over these areas. It is also 
puzzling whether the existing international legal mechanisms are suffi-
ciently effective to prevent such a situation being repeated in the future. 
In conclusion it must be said that in the face of the armed operations in 
eastern Ukraine, whose essence is most aptly reflected in the term ‘hybrid 
war,’ preceded by the aggression of the Russian Federation, the interna-
tional community, wishing to maintain a certain system of values and 
basic principles of international law, had a duty to take decisive actions. 
The lack of unambiguous and concrete actions on the part of leaders of 
other countries or international organizations led to the expansion of the 
area of military operations. It should be remembered that after the anne-
xation of the Crimean Peninsula, the Russian Federation tried to enlarge 
the area of military operations to create a land-based link to the peninsula. 
The lack of unambiguous and concrete actions may ultimately lead to the 
emergence of new territories where the Russian Federation will feel obli-
ged to ‘protect’ the rights of Russian-speaking populations. It is obvious 
that taking decisive and unambiguous actions is largely dependent on the 
political will of a country’s leaders. More important than that, however, 
is to initiate and, subsequently, introduce changes to specific legal and 
international mechanisms.
The war in Ukraine confirmed a certain ineffectiveness of the UN Se-
curity Council as one of its permanent members is a state directly invo-
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lved in the situation which is the subject of its meeting, without even 
mentioning the fact that the resolution of the conflict is not in the interest 
of that member state. Therefore, it should be considered whether this situ-
ation does not diminish the role of the UN Security Council in responding 
to any manifestations of threats to peace and security, or even does not re-
duce its role to a certain declaratory confirmation of an existing situation. 
Contrary to appearances, the situation in eastern Ukraine and its effects 
are not a problem for this particular country. If both the government in 
Kiev and the governments of other countries do not draw the appropriate 
consequences, the situation may be repeated, but in another region or 
state. International organizations and leaders of other countries must take 
actions that clearly show that violations of the system of values  and basic 
principles of international law will not be accepted, and provoking a thre-
at to peace and security will have an equally severe consequence.
Conclusion
In the second half of the twenty-first century, in the area of  internatio-
nal security, a new trend of the increasing role of conflicts played out in 
a non-traditional way can be observed. These actions are deliberately kept 
by the aggressor at a level below the identifiable threshold of a regular 
war (Banasik, 2017, p. 20). It is highly probable that a protracted conflict 
will have consequences, manifested in lowering international security. 
There are voices in Europe indicating that Ukraine is not the ultimate 
goal for Putin, just as Czechoslovakia was not the ultimate goal for Hi-
tler (Felsztinski, Stanczew, 2015, pp. 9–11). Admittedly, the theoretical 
outline of the need to counteract hybrid threats is captured by the new 
NATO Strategic Concept, pointing to the need to develop international 
cooperation to combat unconventional threats, but in practice the conflict 
in Ukraine has tested this concept, and the prior conception of a hybrid 
war, that it was usually conducted by the weaker party.
The constantly strengthening position of Russia in the international 
arena, combined with elements of the hybrid war, is another proof of the 
weakness in which the institutions of general security found themselves, 
which in political practice leads, among other things, to questioning exi-
sting international agreements. In this respect, most experts believe that 
the unstoppable aggressive Russian actions in Ukraine at this stage will 
result in a growing threat of destabilization throughout the region of Cen-
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tral and Eastern Europe. To this end, activities should be closely coordi-
nated “not only between individual public offices, but also representatives 
of business, media and the non-governmental sector. It seems very unli-
kely” (Lucas, 2015, p. 16).
These justified forecasts do not translate into the practice of interna-
tional organizations, and world leaders seem to be primarily guided by 
their own political interests in seeking a solution to the Ukraine-Russia 
conflict, in which geopolitical exchanges in Central and Eastern Europe 
are of secondary importance. This also explains the lack of substantial de-
cisions by the President of the United States, as well as Western European 
leaders on providing Ukraine with the necessary military support, which 
is the reason for the wider criticism of independent opinion-forming cen-
ters. The question remains, what attitude will the U.S. President, Donald 
Trump, take on the conflict in Ukraine? At present, the Minsk summit is 
considered a key condition for lifting restrictions on Russia in the We-
stern capitals. However, the success of the Minsk plan means a formal 
transformation of the conflict in the Donbas from an international pro-
blem to an internal problem of Ukraine. Ukrainian analysts strive to ad-
opt a narrative, according to which the Russia-Ukraine conflict should be 
considered in a broader context: “For Russia, the conquest of Ukraine is 
a step towards rebuilding the world order and pursuing its own interests, 
a necessary premise for a further offensive on Europe, an example for in-
timidation, rather than the goal itself; Kyiv is fighting primarily and mo-
stly for its future, but, having won this campaign and receiving Ukraine’s 
reserves, Russia will become much more confident and more aggressive. 
Everyone will see a really different Russia. The West will have to stop it 
not at Siwerśkyj	Doneć	and not on the Dnieper, but on the Bug and the 
Vistula, if not on the Oder. And not only Ukrainians will pay with their 
lives” (Trofymowych, 2016, p. 184).
From the point of view of the security of the Poland, the ‘Ukrainian 
model’ is particularly important, due to the so-called aggression level be-
low the threshold of war. In the context of Poland’s security, it is neces-
sary to create an information security doctrine that takes into account the 
Russian specificity of activities. It would be a reference point for legisla-
tive activity, precisely defining the threats resulting from new military 
operations and their effects, especially in a situation where Poland has no 
material, technological and financial potential to prepare a symmetrical 
response to Russian forms of information influence. The events in Ukra-
ine have shown that hybrid war can be used by one of the parties to the 
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conflict to deliberately limit the scale of conducted military operations, in 
order to prevent the state of war and aggressor from being clearly defined, 
and thus prevent the international community from reacting. This issue is 
important because it may have an impact on the provision of allied assi-
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Niemilitarny wymiar wojny hybrydowej na Ukrainie 
 
Streszczenie
Artykuł analizuje strukturę, treść, właściwości i skutki rosyjsko-ukraińskiej 
„wojny hybrydowej” w jej niemilitarnym wymiarze. Szczególny nacisk położono na 
aspekt wojny informacyjnej, propagandowej oraz działań w cyberprzestrzeni. Kon-
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flikt rosyjsko-ukraiński scharakteryzowany został w kontekście strategii nowej wojny 
autorstwa generała Walerija Gierasimowa. Współczesna praktyka działań hybrydo-
wych w konflikcie zbrojnym na Ukrainie uwidoczniła, że po raz pierwszy to prze-
ciwnik silniejszy, Rosja, wykorzystuje pełne spektrum oddziaływania hybrydowego 
na przeciwnika słabego i niezdolnego do obrony integralności własnego terytorium. 
Konflikt zbrojny lat 2013–2014 pokazał nie tylko słabość państwa ukraińskiego, ale 
co ważniejsze niewydolność organizacji odpowiadających za zapewnienie bezpie-
czeństwa międzynarodowego: NATO, OBWE i ONZ. W dalszej perspektywie czaso-
wej należy zauważyć, że eskalacja działań hybrydowych na Ukrainie bez wątpienia 
zagraża państwom „prawej flanki” Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego. Przeprowadzona 
analiza odnosi się do problemu zdefiniowanego w formie pytań: na czym polega istota 
operacji hybrydowych? Jaki jest charakter niewojskowych operacji hybrydowych? 
Jaki był przebieg tych działań na Ukrainie? Jak interpretowano prawo międzynarodo-
we w odniesieniu do tego konfliktu?
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